This article discussed some of the questions posed around s.33, examining cases dating back to 1915 that are still being applied in our courts today, which in turn hinders the success of one of the legislative reforms implemented by the statutes with respect to the rights of members. As has been argued, it is disconcerting to know why a party of such a contract, which is both a director and a member (shareholder), is subject to the same statutes, can enforce the statutes when an issue influences its position as a member, but does not have a contract that it may have, if the company violates the same articles and plays its role as a foreigner. As always, the law is not perfect, but there has been a century of controversy over the magnitude and impact of S. 33, and it is reasonable to conclude that s.33 needs reform to clarify what type of contract is the incorporation of the company and the extent of its contractual identity. Section 33 is too silent on the articles that a member can apply and who can apply them: is a member contractually limited to impose selective provisions? Or are the strength and scope of the contract so important that a member can assert rights to a right or obligation described in the articles? Lord Wedderburn was an influential figure who took root for the reform of s.14, and his remit is indisputable, but the case law undermines his efforts, see 33 to clarify and minimize his needs for reform. The case of Eley v Positive Government Security Assurance Co.  1 Ex D 88 is an example. The complainant was the company`s lawyer and according to the statutes, he would always remain that way. He later became a member and it did not take long for the company to remove him from his duties as a lawyer. Salmon attempted to invoke the contractual effect of the sections, but during the hearing the court found that he was asserting his complaint as counsel, that he had imposed a “personal right” and not a right to membership, and therefore could not rely on s.33. If, as Lord Wedderburn ardently stated, members can take legal action against all statutes, then the legal motivation behind this case would be reversed.  Eley (a foreigner) could have, by his status as a member, made a “personal claim” against the company if, as in this case, the personal claim is indicated in the articles.
The courts have held that this issue can be resolved to some extent in practice, and Nwafo also agrees; as members who are also “marginals” in the sense that they are also directors or lawyers, a company can always sue if it has a separate contract with that company and not directly locate its statutes. While the limited scope of s.33 cannot limit these “outsiders” in certain circumstances, it is not excusable, s.33, to be ambiguous and virtually unrealistic as to who should be able to assert their rights and obligations because of their membership status. Gideon Shirazi drew attention to the controversy of this debate by comparing Hickman to Salmon v Quin – Axten Ltd  A.C 442.